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Threshold-Secure Coding with Shared Key
Nasser Aldaghri, Student Member, IEEE, and Hessam Mahdavifar, Member, IEEE
Abstract—Cryptographic protocols are often implemented at
upper layers of communication networks, while error-correcting
codes are employed at the physical layer. In this paper, we con-
sider utilizing readily-available physical layer functions, such
as encoders and decoders, together with shared keys to provide
a threshold-type security scheme. To this end, we first consider
a scenario where the effect of the physical layer is omitted and
all the channels between the involved parties are assumed to
be noiseless. We introduce a model for threshold-secure cod-
ing, where the legitimate parties communicate using a shared
key such that an eavesdropper does not get any information, in
an information-theoretic sense, about the key as well as about
any subset of the input symbols of size up to a certain threshold.
Then, a framework is provided for constructing threshold-
secure codes form linear block codes while characterizing the
requirements to satisfy the reliability and security conditions.
Moreover, we propose a threshold-secure coding scheme, based
on Reed-Muller (RM) codes, that meets security and reliabil-
ity conditions. Furthermore, it is shown that the encoder and
the decoder of the scheme can be implemented efficiently with
quasi-linear time complexity. In particular, a successive cancel-
lation decoder is shown for the RM-based coding scheme. Then
we extend the setup to the scenario where the channel between
the legitimate parties is no longer noiseless. The reliability con-
dition for noisy channels is then modified accordingly, and a
method is described to construct codes attaining threshold se-
curity as well as desired reliability, i.e., robustness against the
channel noise. Moreover, we propose a coding scheme based on
RM codes for threshold security and robustness designed for
binary erasure channels along with a unified successive cancel-
lation decoder. The proposed threshold-secure coding schemes
are flexible and can be adapted for different key lengths.
I. INTRODUCTION
Conventional cryptosystems are often designed to be com-
putationally secure by relying on unproven assumptions of
hardness of mathematical problems. Information-theoretic
security methods provide an alternative approach by con-
structing codes for keyless secure communication, as in
wiretap channels introduced in a seminal work by Wyner [2].
Since then, various types of wiretap channels have been con-
sidered in the literature [3], [4], and with employing different
coding schemes as in [5], [6].
Several approaches to provide security in the physical
layer assuming shared secret keys have been considered in
the literature. Such shared keys can be either fixed prior to
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communication as in classical cryptographic protocols or
can be extracted from a source of common randomness [7]
such as characteristics of physical layer channel, see, e.g.,
[8]–[10]. For instance, a variation of the wiretap channel
model, where a shared secret key is assumed to be constantly
generated by the legitimate parties, namely Alice and Bob,
is studied in [11]. Another approach is to design an encryp-
tion scheme that utilizes properties of certain modulation
schemes such as orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing
(OFDM) to ensure security, see, e.g., [12]–[14]. Other re-
lated works include using channel reciprocity properties [15],
classical stream ciphers at the physical layer [16], introduc-
ing artificial noise [17], multiple-input and multiple-output
(MIMO) systems [18], public-key based McEliece cryptosys-
tem [19], and using error-correcting codes for encryption
[20], [21]. These prior works either consider noisy chan-
nels as in the wiretap channel model, or utilize cryptographic
primitives being evaluated using cryptographic measures
rather than information-theoretical measures to establish se-
curity. Another related line of research is secure network
coding, where a wiretapper has access to a certain num-
ber of edges in a network over which a source wishes to
communicate messages securely. Several works have consid-
ered information-theoretic security measures while designing
network codes, see, e.g., [22], [23].
Utilizing error-correcting codes to provide security in
the physical layer enables sharing hardware resources be-
tween reliability and security schemes in low-cost devices.
Consequently, this leads to a promising approach for low-
complexity applications, such as Internet-of-Things (IoT)
networks. In this paper, we consider using block codes to pro-
vide a threshold-type security scheme. A fixed key is assumed
to be securely shared between the legitimate parties Alice and
Bob a priori. First, we consider a scenario where the effect of
the physical layer is abstracted out and all the channels be-
tween the involved parties are assumed to be noiseless. In
other words, Alice communicates to Bob over a noiseless
channel and her transmissions reach an eavesdropper, namely
Eve, also through a noiseless channel, as shown in Figure 1.
The security condition in this model is described as follows.
Alice encodes her message using the shared key while ensur-
ing that Eve does not obtain any information about the key
as well as about any subset of the input message symbols of
size up to a certain threshold t. This condition is referred to
as the t-threshold security condition. Then we consider the
case where Alice and Bob share a noisy channel, while the
eavesdropper Eve acquires Alice’s transmission noise-free.
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Figure 1. System setup for the proposed coding scheme.
The considered threshold-type security becomes relevant in
applications where the knowledge of most, if not all, of the
individual data symbols is needed in order to deduce mean-
ingful knowledge about the content of the message. Examples
of this type of data includes measurement numbers, network
commands, the address of data in a dataset, as well as bar-
codes or data in any application where the data symbols are
already scrambled, hashed, or masked prior to being en-
coded. Furthermore, ensuring the security of the key in the
model guarantees that it can be, theoretically, used infinitely
many times without leaking any information about it or the
messages to Eve.
In the setups considered in this paper, we deviate from con-
ventional physical-layer security settings by removing any
condition on the channel from Alice to Eve; in fact, we as-
sume this channel is noiseless. However, we still describe
the schemes in a communication setting with the aim of in-
tegrating such schemes with channel coding in the physical
layer. To this end, a general scheme for noiseless channels
using linear block codes for the t-threshold-secure coding
scheme is shown. Furthermore, we describe a specific con-
struction based on RM codes [24] that meets the threshold
security condition, and show an encoder and a decoder, with
quasi-linear complexity, to reliably retrieve the message us-
ing the shared key. Moreover, we discuss a general method
for constructing codes, closely related to concatenated codes
[25], for noisy channels that satisfy the threshold security
requirements with respect to Eve and provide robust com-
munication for Bob in the presence of channel noise. Also,
we propose an explicit RM-based construction that is both
t-threshold-secure and capable of correcting erasures, to-
gether with a unified successive cancellation decoder that
corrects erasures and retrieves the message simultaneously
given the shared key.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion II we describe the setup and formulate the reliability
and the security conditions for noiseless channels based
on information-theoretic measures. The proposed coding
scheme based on linear block codes is described in de-
tail and its security and reliability are evaluated in Section
III. Then, we describe an explicit coding scheme based on
RM codes together with an encoder and a successive can-
cellation decoder in Section IV. A general construction of
threshold-secure codes for noisy channels together with an
explicit low-complexity RM-based coding scheme for binary
erasure channels (BEC) are discussed in Section V. Finally,
we conclude the paper in Section VI, and discuss several
directions for future work.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a system model where Alice wishes to securely
communicate with Bob, both are legitimate parties, through
a noiseless channel. The eavesdropper, namely Eve, is tap-
ping into that channel and observes all the transmitted sym-
bols, as shown in Figure 1. Alice and Bob share a common
key sequence k of length k, that can be used for encoding and
decoding of message m of length m. Both the key and the
message symbols are from an alphabet of size q, where q is
a prime power. A certain known permutation pi(.) of Alice’s
message sequence m together with the key sequence k is fed
as the input to the encoder, denoted by u, i.e., u = pi(k,m).
The length of u is n = m + k and is encoded to a codeword
c of length m. The entries in k as well as in m are assumed
to be independent and uniformly distributed. Alice then trans-
mits the codeword c to Bob over the noiseless channel. Bob
receives the codeword and decodes it using the key k to re-
trieve the message m. Eve observes c and aims at extracting
information about the message m as well as the key k. In this
setup, Alice and Bob agree on the encoder and the decoder a
priori, which are also publicly known to Eve.
In this model, the security condition is the following. Al-
though parts of input u are disclosed to Eve, no knowledge,
in an information-theoretic sense, about any subset of size up
to a certain threshold parameter t of the input symbols will be
leaked to Eve. Note that this is different with the traditional
measure of information-theoretic security where the mutual
information between the entire message block and Eve’s ob-
servation needs to be zero/almost zero. In a sense, we con-
sider a sub-block-wise measure of information-theoretic se-
curity. We aim at designing an encoder and a decoder for a
noiseless channel that utilizes a shared key k to encode a mes-
sage m such that the following conditions are met:
1) Reliability: Bob is able to decode the message, knowing
the key with, probability one, i.e.,
H(m|c, k) = 0. (1)
2) Key security: the codeword c does not reveal any infor-
mation about the key k, i.e.,
I(k; c) = 0. (2)
3) t-threshold security: for any v ⊆ {u1,u2,..., un} with
|v| = t, we have
H(v|c) = H(v), (3)
where t is a design parameter specified later.
3Remark 1. Note that the secrecy capacity of the communica-
tion system in Figure 1, even with a relaxed security condi-
tion of I(m, c) ≈ 0, i.e., weak security, is zero [2]. In a re-
lated work [11], a source of common randomness is required
to generate a key with a certain rate Rk to ensure non-zero se-
crecy capacity. However, here, a key of a fixed length is used
repeatedly. In a sense, this implies that the key rate is zero as
the message length grows large.
A formal definition of the threshold security parameter t is
as follows:
Definition 1: The threshold security parameter t for an en-
coder with input u and output c is defined as
t=max({|v| | v⊆{u1,u2,...,un}, H(v|c)=H(v)}). (4)
Next, the notion of t-threshold security of a code is defined.
Definition 2: We say a code is t-threshold secure if it meets
the reliability and security conditions, where t is as defined in
Definition 1.
It is worth noting that the model considered in this
paper subsumes a range of previously studied models,
e.g., the perfectly-secure one-time-pad (OTP) encryption
which is a code with threshold t = m and hence, we
have H(m|c) = H(m). Another related line of work is
on certain types of keyless security schemes known as
unconditionally-secure all-or-nothing transforms (AONT)
[26]. More specifically, cases are studied where the eaves-
dropper observes a vector z whose elements are a subset
of size m − t of the set of elements of c, where c is of
length m [27]. The security condition is then translated to
H(v|z) = H(v) for all v of size t as in [27].
III. CODING SCHEMES
With a slight abuse of terminology, we refer to a scheme
meeting the reliability and security conditions, as described in
Section II, simply as a coding scheme. When constructing the
coding scheme, we aim at designing an encoder and a decoder
as well as specifying the code. For an input u = pi(k,m) the
encoder produces a codeword c as follows
c = uW = pi(k,m)W, (5)
where W is an n × m matrix with n = m + k. In this pro-
posed scheme, we consider this matrix as the transpose of a
generator matrix G of a linear block code.
Consider a [n,m, dmin]q linear code with generator matrix
G, i.e., a linear code whose elements are from an alphabet of
size q, and has rate R = m/n and minimum distance dmin.
Note that in this setup no redundancy in the codeword is re-
quired since the channel is noiseless. We aim at utilizing the
generator matrix G of certain linear codes to construct a ma-
trixW for our coding scheme such that the reliability and se-
curity conditions are met.
One can assume that the length of the key is less than the
length of the message; otherwise, if k > m, then the straight-
forward perfectly-secure one-time pad meets the conditions
for t = m. To encode a message m, let us denote the set
of indices of the rows of W that correspond to the message
symbols as A ⊆ [m + k]
def
= {1, 2, ...,m + k}. Then the set
of indices of the rows corresponding to the key symbols is
Ac = [m + k] \ A. The codeword c is then expressed as fol-
lows:
c = mWA + kWAc . (6)
The choice of pi(.), which corresponds to the choice ofA and
Ac, is critical in ensuring security and reliability conditions.
Hence, we have the following definition.
Definition 3: A code, as described above, is called proper
if its matrix satisfies the following requirements:
1) The resulting submatrix WA is full row rank, i.e.,
rank(WA) = m.
2) The resulting submatrix WAc is also full row rank, i.e.,
rank(WAc) = k.
One example of codes that are not proper is the turbo code
[28] whose generator matrix can be written in the form G =
[Im A1 A2] where Im is the identity matrix whose columns
are dedicated to the message while the rest are dedicated to
the key. Note thatA2 is some row-permuted version ofA1, and
such a permutationmay not necessarily result in [A1 A2]
T be-
ing a full row-rank matrix. Hence, this code is not necessarily
proper. A code that is not proper will result in a lower equivo-
cation rate for Eve about the message, and leads to leakage of
information about the key to Eve, as will be clarified through-
out this section.
Next, we show that if a code is proper, then it meets the re-
liability condition, as specified in (1), and the security condi-
tions, as specified in (2) and (3). The following lemma shows
that the reliability condition is satisfied.
Lemma 1: Suppose that the code used in the coding
scheme is proper, as defined in Definition 3. Then Bob can
recover the message with probability one under maximum a
posteriori (MAP) decoding. In other words,
H(m|c, k) = 0. (7)
Proof: By using (6), it can be observed that since Bob
has c and k and since WA is full rank, then Bob can subtract
kWAc from c and then find m fromWA, which has a unique
solution.
In the next theorem, we show that a proper code meets the
key security condition, as specified in (2). Note that satisfying
this condition is very critical as even a very small leakage of
the key k can lead to the entire key being revealed to Eve af-
ter using the scheme several times, thereby compromising the
security of the message.
Theorem 2: Suppose that the code used in the cod-
ing scheme is proper, as defined in Definition 3. Then the
codeword c leaks no information about the key k, i.e.,
I(k; c) = 0. (8)
4Proof: The proof is by observing the following set of
equalities:
I(k; c) = H(c)−H(c|k), (9)
= m log2(q)−H(mWA + kWAc |k), (10)
= m log2(q)−H(mWA), (11)
= log2(q)(m − rank(WA)), (12)
= 0, (13)
where (10) holds by (6) and the uniformity of the key andmes-
sage symbols, hence the codewords are uniform, (11) holds
because m and k are independent, (12) is by noting that el-
ements of m are uniformly distributed and independent, and
(13) holds because rank(WA) = m as the code is proper ac-
cording to Definition 3.
The following lemma is well-known. However, it is
included here as it is instrumental in characterizing the
threshold security of coding schemes based on linear codes.
Lemma 3: [29] For an [n,m, dmin]q linear code with gen-
erator matrixG, any submatrix ofG of sizem× (n−n1) ob-
tained by deleting columns indexed by elements of D, where
D ⊆ [n] with |D| = dmin − 1, has full row rank, i.e.,
rank(GDc) = m. (14)
In the next theorem, we characterize the threshold security
of coding schemes based on linear codes.
Theorem 4: A coding scheme constructed by a matrix
W = GT, whereG is the generator matrix of an [n,m, dmin]q
linear code, is t-threshold secure, where t = dmin − 1, i.e.,
we have
H(v|c) = H(v), (15)
for any v ⊆ {u1, u2, ..., un} with |v| = t, and t is the maxi-
mum value for which this condition holds.
Proof: Let u denote the input to the encoder for the cod-
ing scheme, as specified in (5). Suppose that v consists of el-
ements of u indexed by B = {i1, i2, ..., it} ⊆ [n], and u˜ con-
sists of elements of u indexed by Bc = [n] \ B. Then we have
the following:
I(v; c) = H(c)−H(c|v), (16)
= m log2(q)−H(u˜WBc + vWB|v), (17)
= m log2(q)−H(u˜WBc), (18)
= log2(q)(m− rank(WBc)), (19)
= 0, (20)
where (17) follows due to codewords being uniformly dis-
tributed and expansion of random variables, (18) holds by
the independence of v and u˜, (19) holds due to the unifor-
mity of u˜, and (20) holds by Lemma 3 with t = dmin − 1.
Since the mutual information I(v; c) is zero, it implies that
the t-threshold security criteria is met for the parameter
t = dmin − 1, i.e.,
H(v|c) = H(v), (21)
for any v with |v| = t, where t = dmin − 1.
Next, we need to show that t = dmin − 1 is the maximum
value for which the threshold security condition holds. Con-
sider a codeword in the codebook generated by G that has the
Hamming weight equal to t + 1 = dmin with non-zero ele-
ments at indices denoted by F = {i1, i2, ..., it+1}. Then we
have the following:
H(ui1 , ..., uit+1 |c) = H(ui1 , ..., uit |c)
+H(uit+1 |c, ui1 , ..., uit), (22)
= H(ui1 , ..., uit |c), (23)
6= H(ui1 , ..., uit+1), (24)
where (22) follows from the chain rule of entropy, and (23)
holds because there exists a linear combination of the entries
of c = (c1, c2, ..., cm) such that
∑m
i=1 λici =
∑
j∈F αjuj .
Hence, the second term becomes zero, since uit+1 is uniquely
determined given c and {ui1 , ..., uit}. Therefore, due to (24),
the threshold security condition does not hold for t+1 = dmin.
Corollary 5: For any t-threshold secure coding scheme,
constructed from a linear block code, with message lengthm,
key length k, and code length n = m+ k, we have t 6 k.
Proof: The proof follows by Theorem4 together with
Singleton bound on the minimum distance of a code.
Next, we characterize Eve’s equivocation about the entire
message m after observing the codeword.
Corollary 6: If the code is proper, then Eve’s equivocation
about the entire encoded message m after observing the code-
word is equal to the entropy of the key, i.e.,
H(m|c) = k log2(q). (25)
Proof:We have the following
H(m|c) = H(m)−H(c) +H(c|m), (26)
=H(kWAc + mWA|m), (27)
= H(kWAc), (28)
= k log2(q), (29)
where (27) follows due to the uniformity of messages and
codewords, and expansion of random vectors, (28) holds be-
cause of the independence of m and k, and (29) holds by
noting that the matrix WAc is full row rank since the code is
proper.
The statement of Corollary 6 can be also rephrased by stat-
ing that the probability of successfully retrieving the entire
message block by Eve is equal to q−k.
Now that we have established the properties that the cod-
ing schemes based on linear codes satisfy, we need to show
how to maximize the threshold t as stated in Corollary 5, pro-
vided that q is large enough. To this end, we utilize maximum
distance separable (MDS) codes to arrive at the following the-
orem.
5Theorem 7: For any message length m and key length k,
there exists a proper code with threshold t = k, provided that
the alphabet size q > m+ k + 1.
Proof: To prove the theorem, we give an example of
a code that is shown to be proper with t = k. We utilize
Reed-Solomon (RS) codes, which are a well-known family
of codes that are maximum distance separable (MDS) codes,
i.e., dmin = n −m + 1 = k + 1 [29]. For any [n,m, dmin]q
RS code, all we need to show is that the matrix W which is
the transpose of the generator matrix G of the RS code can
be used to construct a proper code. One of the properties of
MDS codes is that every set of m columns of the matrix G
are linearly independent [29, Proposition 11.4]. Note that
rows of W correspond to columns of G. Hence, any choice
of m columns of G will have rank m, and the remaining
k columns of G will also have rank k as it is assumed that
k < m. Therefore, the code generated by W is proper, with
threshold t = k.
Note that straightforward Gaussian elimination method,
with complexity O(n3), can be always used for decoding of
coding schemes based on linear codes. However, when the
underlying linear code belongs to well-known families of lin-
ear codes, e.g., Reed-Solomon codes, it is desirable to study
low-complexity decoders for the resulting coding schemes
using the off-the-shelf encoding/decoding methods. For in-
stance, low-complexity decoding of RS codes is based on
low-complexity computation of the inverse of a Vandermonde
matrix. Now, for the coding schemes based on RS codes, the
evaluation points for the RS encoder are chosen as consecu-
tive powers of α, where α is a primitive element of Fq. The
specific choice of the message and key indices is as follows:
the first m rows of W are dedicated for the message m, and
the last k rows ofW are dedicated for the key k. SinceW is a
Vandermonde matrix, this choice of message indices together
with the specific choice of evaluation points result in a sce-
nario where the submatrixWA is also a Vandermondematrix.
To decode a codeword using the key, the decoder computes
m = (c − kWAc)W
−1
A . Note that the inverse of a square
Vandermonde matrix of orderm can be computed with com-
plexity O(m2) [30]. This results in O(m2) complexity for
the decoding in coding schemes based on RS codes.
IV. LOW-COMPLEXITY CONSTRUCTION
In this section, we focus on designing binary codes to
meet the reliability and security conditions while providing
encoding and decoding algorithms with linear/quasi-linear
complexity. To this end, we consider Reed-Muller codes due
to their recursive construction and low-complexity decoder.
In addition, since they are designed with the objective of
maximizing the minimum distance, given their particular re-
cursive structure, we can achieve a reasonably high threshold
t for the t-threshold security.
It is worth noting that various types of decoders for
Reed-Muller codes are proposed in the literature, see, e.g.,
[24], [31], [32]. However, the proposed decoder here differs
from these works as it has different constraints and objec-
tives. The goal of the decoder here is not to correct errors, but
rather to successfully recover the message from an error-free
codeword encoded by having the message as well as the key
as the input. Also, the message cannot be retrieved com-
pletely without complete knowledge of the key itself. This
shows the need to adapt or modify encoders/decoders in
such a way that they can be utilized for threshold-security
decoding accordingly.
A. Encoder
First, a brief description of Reed-Muller codes is provided.
An RM(s, r) code is a [2s,
∑r
i=0
(
s
i
)
, 2s−r]2 linear code. The
generator matrix of the RM(s, r) code, denoted by G(s, r), is
obtained by keeping the rows with the Hamming weight of
at least 2s−r from the matrix FT = (F⊗s2 )
T and removing the
remaining rows, where⊗ denotes the Kronecker product, T is
the transpose operator, and F2 is the following kernel matrix
F2 =
[
1 0
1 1
]
. (30)
Although there are different ways of describing the encod-
ing and the generator matrix of RM codes, the above descrip-
tion helps us to choose the message and bit indices, which is
the next step towards designing a code that is proper. Due to
the recursive structure of F, it can be observed that indices of
the rows with the lowest weight, the second lowest weight, etc,
from F correspond to indices of columns with the highest col-
umn weight, the second highest weight, etc, from F, respec-
tively. When specifying the matrix G(s, r) as a sub-matrix of
FT we choose the set of indices of the removed rows from FT
asAc to assign the rows ofW dedicated for the key, while the
indices of the remaining rows are used as the message indices
A. Then we have the following proposition.
Proposition 8: The choice of the sets A, and Ac as men-
tioned above results in a proper code.
Proof: To prove this proposition, it suffices to show that
WA andWAc are both full row rank.
First, it is shown that WA is full row rank. Note that for a
full rank lower-triangular matrix, a submatrix obtained by re-
moving a subset of columns and rows with the same indices
results also in a full rank lower-triangular matrix. Also, note
that Ac is the subset of indices of deleted columns as well as
that of the rows dedicated for the key from F. Hence, the ma-
trixWA is full row rank.
Next, we show that WAc is full row rank. This is done by
induction. Note that k < m is assumed, as mentioned before.
Also, to simplify the proof, we re-express k and m in the re-
mainder of the proof as follows
k =
r∑
i=0
(
s
i
)
,
6and
m =
s∑
i=r+1
(
s
i
)
,
where we have r 6
⌊
s−1
2
⌋
. Note that WAc contains the∑r
i=0
(
s
i
)
rows dedicated for the key from F with same num-
ber of lowest-weight columns removed. Let this matrix be
also denoted by F(s, r). Let also F′(s, r) denote the ma-
trix that contains the
∑r
i=0
(
s
i
)
rows dedicated for the key
from F with only
∑r−1
i=0
(
s
i
)
lowest weight columns removed.
Due to the recursive structure of the matrix F, F(s, r) can be
expressed as follows:
F(s, r) =
[
F(s− 1, r − 1) 0
F′(s− 1, r) F(s− 1, r)
]
. (31)
Next, we show that the matrix F(s, r) is full row rank for
the maximum value r =
⌊
s−1
2
⌋
and for s > 2 by induction
on s. Then it will be discussed why this also holds for r <⌊
s−1
2
⌋
.
Step 1: The induction basis is for s = 2 and r = 0, and for
s = 3 and r = 1, which can be easily verified, i.e., for s = 2
and r = 0, the rank of F(2, 0) is 1. Also, for s = 3 and r = 1,
the rank of F(3, 1) is 4.
Step 2: Suppose that the induction hypothesis holds for s
and s is odd. Then we have the following matrix:
F(s+ 1, r) =
[
F(s, r − 1) 0
F′(s, r) F(s, r)
]
. (32)
We need to show that rank(F(s+1, r)) =
∑r
i=0
(
s+1
i
)
. Note
that F(s, r) is full row rank by induction hypothesis, i.e.,
rank(F(s, r)) =
∑r
i=0
(
s
i
)
. Then F(s, r − 1), which contains
a subset of the rows in F(s, r), is also full row rank. Hence,
we have rank(F(s, r − 1)) =
∑r−1
i=0
(
s
i
)
. Therefore,
rank(F(s+ 1, r)) = rank(F(s, r − 1))
+ rank(F(s, r)), (33)
=
r−1∑
i=0
(
s
i
)
+
r∑
i=0
(
s
i
)
, (34)
=
r∑
i=0
(
s+ 1
i
)
, (35)
which is equal to the number of rows in F(s+ 1, r). Hence, it
is full row rank.
For even s with corresponding parameter r, we need to
show the following matrix is full row rank
F(s+ 1, r + 1) =
[
F(s, r) 0
F′(s, r + 1) F(s, r + 1)
]
. (36)
First, we have rank(F(s, r)) =
∑r
i=0
(
s
i
)
by induction hy-
pothesis. Regarding rank(F′(s, r + 1)), we can see that
F′(s, r + 1) has
∑r
i=0
(
s
i
)
rows that are also included in
F(s, r). However, when considering the indices of such rows
in [F′(s, r + 1) F(s, r + 1)], the corresponding rows are in-
dependent from all other rows in [F(s, r), 0]. Furthermore,
there are
(
s
r+1
)
additional rows in F′(s, r+1) that are linearly
independent from the remaining rows due to the structure of
the zero blocks in this matrix, similar to (31). We can then
find the rank of F(s+ 1, r + 1) as follows
rank(F(s+ 1, r + 1)) = rank(F(s, r))
+ rank(F′(s, r + 1)), (37)
=
r∑
i=0
(
s
i
)
+
r∑
i=0
(
s
i
)
+
(
s
r + 1
)
,
(38)
=
r+1∑
i=0
(
s+ 1
i
)
. (39)
Hence, F(s+ 1, r+ 1) is full row rank, and the induction hy-
pothesis holds for s + 1 with the maximum value of r. For
keys of shorter lengths, it is straightforward to see that for any
r′ < r, the matrix F(s, r′) whose rows are a subset of F(s, r)
with additional columns inserted at different locations is also
full row rank. This completes the proof.
B. Decoder
In this part, we discuss a low-complexity successive cancel-
lation (SC) decoder to decode the message in the RM-based
coding scheme while utilizing the shared key. As Reed-Muller
codes are closely related to polar codes [33], a decoder closely
related to that of polar codes described in [33] is natural. How-
ever, there are fundamental differences that will be clarified
throughout this section.
The decoder is described in Algorithm 1. We first embed
erasures within the entries of the codeword c in order to get
a vector of length n, denoted by z, by inserting the erasures
at locations indexed by Ac. More specifically, z = pi1(ek, c)
where c is the codeword and ek is an erasure vector of length k
such that the permutation places the erasures at locations de-
noted by Ac. Note that, as mentioned before,Ac corresponds
to the location of the key bits at the encoder.
The decoder takes the key bits k, the codeword embed-
ded with erasures z = pi1(ek, c), indices of the key bits A
c
and a recursion index i as inputs, and outputs the vector
u = [u1, u2, ..., un] = pi(k,m) from which the message can
be retrieved m = uA. The high-level idea of the decoder is
as follows. The vector z is divided into two parts; z
n/2
1 =
[z1, z2, ..., zn/2] and z
n
n/2+1 = [zn/2+1, zn/2+2, ..., zn], that
are decoded successively. As opposed to the SC decoder of
polar codes [33], the second sub-block is processed first, can-
celled from the first sub-block, and then the first sub-block
is processed. Each of these sub-blocks is also decoded
recursively by splitting them into two parts and so on.
Remark 2. When describing the recursive SC decoding pro-
cess we often use the binary tree terminology in which the
input codeword, i.e., z, is assigned to the root of the tree and
7Algorithm 1 Successive cancellation decoder (Decoder)
1: Initialization: i = 1.
2: Input: k, zn1 = pi1(ek, c), A
c, i.
3: Output: hn1 , u
n
1 .
4: if n = 2 then
5: if z2 = e then
6: ui = ki
7: else
8: ui = z2
9: end if
10: if z1 = e then
11: ui−1 = ki−1
12: else
13: ui−1 = ui ⊕ z1
14: end if
15: hn1 = [ui−1 ⊕ ui, ui]
16: else
17: h′ ← Decoder(k2, z
n
n/2+1,A
c
2, 2i)
18: z¯
n/2
1 = h
′ ⊕ z
n/2
1
19: h′′ ← Decoder(k1, z¯
n/2
1 ,A
c
1, 2i− 1)
20: hn1 = [h
′′ ⊕ h′, h′]
21: end if
22: return hn1
then the first and the second sub-blocks are assigned to the left
child and the right child, respectively. The decisions are made
at the leaves of the tree and then are re-encoded and propa-
gated back through the tree, see, e.g., [34] for more details.
The following claim verifies that the decoder successfully
outputs the message bits with probability 1 for any key length.
Note that since the proof follows by induction, we discard the
assumption that k 6 m and simply show the claim for any
k 6 n.
Claim 9: The RM-based coding scheme can be success-
fully decoded using the SC decoder in Algorithm 1 for any
key length k 6 n.
Proof:We use induction on l, where n = 2l, to show that
the claim holds.
Step 1: For the induction basis, consider n = 2. We need
to show decoding is successful for k = 0, 1, 2. For k = 0,
which corresponds to the case with no erasure, the induction
hypothesis holds trivially as F is non-singular. For k = 1,
one needs to show the induction hypothesis for both possible
cases for Ac. First, let us consider that z1 = e and z2 = c1,
which corresponds to u1 = k1, and u2 = m1. In this case,
the decoder outputs u1 = k1 and u2 = z2. For the other case
where z1 = c1 and z2 = e, which corresponds to u1 = m1
and u2 = k1, the decoder first corrects the erasure, assigning
u2 = k1. It then computes u1 = m1 = u2 ⊕ z1 = k1 ⊕ z1.
Finally, we show it succeeds for k = 2, where both z1 and
z2 are erased. Then u1 = k1 and u2 = k2 and the decoder is
successful.
Step 2: Now, suppose that the induction hypothesis holds
for n = 2l and for any k 6 2l, where k is the length of the key,
regardless of the indices of the key bits. However, note that, as
specified before, the row indices corresponding to the key bits
and the column indices corresponding to the erasures are the
same and are both denoted byAc. We now show that the claim
is true for n = 2l+1 and any k 6 2l+1. Let us split the key in-
dices Ac into two sets, Ac1 and A
c
2, with sizes |A
c
1| = k1 and
|Ac2| = k2, where k = k1 + k2, as follows. The set A
c
1 con-
sists of the indices of erasures in z
n/2
1 . Also, let k1 denote the
corresponding part of the key of size k1. Similarly, A
c
2 con-
sists of the indices of erasures in znn/2+1. Also, let k2 denote
the corresponding part of the key of size k2. First, the right
child with input znn/2+1, which has k2 erasures, is processed.
Note that there are also k2 known key bits indexed by A
c
2 in
the second half sub-block unn/2+1. Note that the decoder for
the right child has an input of length n′ = 2l and k′ = k2
erasures as well as key bits k2 indexed by A
c
2. The decoder
succeeds according by induction hypothesis. The right child
then passes
unn/2+1F
⊗l
2 ⊕ z
n/2
1 = h
′ ⊕ z
n/2
1 = z¯
n/2
1
to the left child. The decoder is then run on z¯
n/2
1 , which is
of length n′ = 2l and has k′ = k1 erasures and key bits k1
indexed byAc1. The decoder is successful on this node as well
by induction hypothesis. Hence, the decoder is successful for
n = 2l+1 which completes the proof of the claim.
V. ROBUSTNESS
In this section we study a natural scenario for extension
of the considered setup and the results. In particular, it is as-
sumed that a noisy channel is present between the legitimate
parties and the goal is to study the robustness of the frame-
work and the proposed solution when channel noise is present.
The revised system model, shown in Figure 2, is as follows:
the channel between Alice and Bob is no longer noiseless,
and it can be a certain type of channel to be studied, e.g.,
binary symmetric channel (BSC), binary erasure channel
(BEC), additive-white Gaussian noise channel (AWGN), etc.
However, for the eavesdropper, we still consider a worst-case
scenario from the legitimate parties’ perspective. In other
words, it is assumed that Eve receives the transmitted code-
word through a noiseless channel and hence, she has access
to the codeword error-free. Alice aims to utilize a coding
scheme such that the threshold security requirement at Eve is
satisfied, while establishing a reliable communication with
Bob that is robust in the presence of channel noise.
Note that the assumption on Eve’s observation here makes
it reasonable to keep the conditions in (2) and (3) the same in
this revised model. On the other hand, the reliability condi-
tion in (1) needs to be modified to account for the noisy chan-
nel. We do this from a conventional block coding perspective
where reliability is measured in terms of a certain number of
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Figure 2. Modified setup for the proposed coding scheme in the presence of
a noisy channel.
errors and erasures that can be corrected. More specifically,
the reliability condition is still stated as
H(m|y, k) = 0, (40)
provided that the number of erasures and errors introduced in
y satisfies a certain condition that depends on the underlying
coding scheme. For instance, consider coding schemes based
on linear codes. Suppose that the minimum distance of the
coding scheme isDmin when the key is fixed. Then the condi-
tion on the number of errors and erasures is simply 2τ + ρ 6
Dmin−1, where τ is the number of errors and ρ is the number
of erasures, same as in conventional block codes.
In remaining of this section, we discuss a general method to
construct codes for threshold security and robustness, and de-
scribe an explicit low-complexity construction based on Reed-
Muller codes for binary erasure channels along with a SC de-
coder.
A. General construction
A straightforward solution to construct coding schemes
for the setting described in this section is by utilizing con-
catenation of two codes. More specifically, a coding scheme,
constructed to guarantee the desired threshold security in the
error-free case, would be concatenated with an inner code,
that can be an off-the-shelf block code, to guarantee the de-
sired reliability for Alice-Bob communication. Although
this solution is straightforward, one needs to ensure that the
threshold security guarantee is not compromised when more
redundancy is added through the inner encoder which will be
then revealed to Eve.
In the aforementioned concatenation scheme, the overall
encoder and decoder at Alice and Bob, respectively, are re-
ferred to as supercoder and superdecoder, respectively. The
construction of the concatenated scheme is described in more
details next. Consider a proper coding scheme, that guar-
antees threshold security requirement, that is obtained from
an [n,m, dmin]q linear code with the generator matrix W
T .
Also, consider an error-correcting code, used as an inner code
to guarantee the reliability, that is an [N,m,Dmin]q linear
code with the generator matrix denoted by Gr. It is important
to note that both codes have the same dimensionm.
The encoding process is as follows. First, u = pi(k,m) is
passed through the outer threshold security encoder that mul-
tiplies u byW. The result is then passed to the inner encoder,
i.e., which multiplies that byGr. Then the resulting codeword
c = uWGr is transmitted to Bob through the noisy chan-
nel. Bob receives a corrupted version of the codeword c, de-
noted as y, and passes it through the decoder consisting of
an inner decoder and an outer decoder. The inner decoder re-
trieves c˜ = uW. Note that we have c˜ error-free provided that
the number of errors and/or erasures satisfies the given con-
dition on the reliability guarantee of the inner code. Then c˜
together with the key k are passed through the outer decoder,
designed for the threshold security coding scheme; hence, re-
trieving m. The following lemma states that this construction
does not compromise the key and threshold security condi-
tions.
Lemma 10: The aforementioned concatenation scheme re-
sults in a t-threshold secure code.
Proof: To show that the lemma holds, we need to have
rank(WGr) = m, rank(WAGr) = m, rank(WAcGr) = k,
and rank(WBcGr) = m, where A and A
c are chosen such
that the code is proper, as stated in Definition 3, and Bc is as
defined in Theorem 4. It can be observed that all these equa-
tions hold simply because Gr is full row rank.
B. Low-complexity construction
In this section, we aim at presenting a unified coding
scheme, for threshold security and robustness, that can be
decoded using one unified SC decoder. This would poten-
tially result in more efficient hardware implementation and
improved latency compared to the general concatenated
scheme.
In particular, a scenario with binary symbol erasures is con-
sidered, where at most ρ = Dmin − 1 erasures are assumed
to occur with Dmin being the minimum distance of the un-
derlying code. For the proposed coding scheme, an encoder
is presented together with a superdecoder that simultaneously
corrects erasures and decodes the message using the key. To
this end, the coding scheme presented for noiseless channels
in Section IV is extended to be utilized along with an RM-
based code to handle binary erasures.
1) Encoder: In the considered scheme, the same RM code
is used for threshold security and robustness. More specifi-
cally, an RM(s, r) is used, which is, as previously described,
a [2s,
∑r
i=0
(
s
i
)
, 2s−r]2 with the generator matrix denoted by
G(s, r). The encoder with input u, consisting of both the mes-
sage and the key, outputs the codeword c specified as follows:
c = uGT (s, r)G(s, r) = uG˜(s, r), (41)
where G˜(s, r) is a notation introduced here to denote
GT (s, r)G(s, r). Note the the encoder can be implemented
recursively, since G˜(s, r) can be expressed recursively as
shown in (45).
9G˜(s, r) = GT (s, r)G(s, r), (42)
=
[
GT (s−1, r−1) GT (s−1, r)
0 GT (s−1, r)
] [
G(s−1, r−1) 0
G(s−1, r) G(s−1, r)
]
, (43)
=
[
GT (s−1, r−1)G(s−1, r−1) +GT (s−1, r)G(s−1, r) GT (s−1, r)G(s−1, r)
GT (s−1, r)G(s−1, r) GT (s−1, r)G(s−1, r)
]
, (44)
=
[
G˜(s− 1, r − 1) + G˜(s− 1, r) G˜(s− 1, r)
G˜(s− 1, r) G˜(s− 1, r)
]
. (45)
Note that the encoder described by (41) utilizes the con-
struction presented in Section IV-A and we use the same
choice of indices dedicated for the key and the message that
results in a proper code.
2) Decoder: We present a unified SC superdecoder for the
coding scheme described above that corrects ρ 6 Dmin −
1 erasures, where Dmin = 2
s−r, and recovers the message
given the shared key. The recursive decoder takes the received
bit sequence yn1 , the shared key k, key indices A
c, code pa-
rameters s, r, and a recursion parameter j as inputs. Initially,
j = 1. It outputs hn1 , i.e., which is equal to the codeword c
provided that ρ 6 Dmin − 1, as well as u
n
1 = pi(k,m), which
is used to retrieve the message m, and a recursion index j′
used to track the index of the last decoded bit. A pseudocode
for the decoder is shown in Algorithm 2. The following claim
shows the success of the described decoder.
Claim 11: The proposed unified RM-based coding scheme
together with the unified SC superdecoder in Algorithm 2 suc-
cessfully retrieves the message as long as ρ 6 Dmin − 1.
Proof: Let the received sequence be denoted by yn1 which
has at most ρ erasures. Let also the key bits be denoted by k
which are assigned to entries of u indexed by elements ofAc.
We use induction on the parameter s of the underlying RM
code of length 2s to prove the claim. The induction hypoth-
esis is that the decoder is successful for any RM-based cod-
ing scheme of length 2s with some parameter r 6 s, and a
key with size
∑s
i=r+1
(
s
i
)
, assuming there are at most ρ =
2s−r − 1 erasures. The induction base is s = 0, for which the
induction hypothesis is trivial. Now, suppose that the induc-
tion hypothesis holds for s and we want to show it for s+ 1.
Case 1: r = 0, i.e., we have an RM(s+1, 0) which becomes
a repetition code of length n = 2s+1. In this case, G˜(s+1, 0)
is the all-ones matrix and the entries of codeword are all equal
to the sum of entries in u. Note that the number of message
bits is m =
∑r
i=0
(
s+1
i
)
= 1 and we have 2s+1 − 1 key
bits. Also, the maximum number of erasures the code can cor-
rect is 2s+1− 1. Hence, the decoder successfully retrieves the
message bit using the non-erasure symbols, which there is at
least one, in yn1 . Suppose that the non-erasure bit is indexed
by i1. Since the locations of the key bits are known, we can
place them at their respective locations retrieving ui’s for all
i ∈ Ac. Next, the message bit located at i′ is retrieved as
Algorithm 2Unified SC decoder for binary erasures (DecBE)
1: Input: k, yn1 , A
c, s, r, j.
2: Output: hn1 , u
n
1 , j
′.
3: if r = 0 then
4: I = [j, j + 1, ...., j + 2s − 1]
5: i1 ← index of any non-erasure bit in y
n
1 .
6: for i ∈ Ac do
7: ui = ki
8: end for
9: i′ ∈ I \ Ac
10: ui′ = yi1 ⊕i∈Ac ui
11: hn1 = [yi1 , yi1 , ..., yi1 ]
12: j′ = j + 2s − 1
13: else
14: y¯ = y
n/2
1 ⊕ y
n
n/2+1
15: h′1, u
n/2
1 , j
′
1 ← DecBE(k1, y¯,A
c
1, s−1, r−1, j)
16: h′2 = u
n/2
1 G˜(s− 1, r)
17: h′ = [h′1 ⊕ h
′
2, h
′
2]
18: y˜n1 = y
n
1 ⊕ h
′ = [y˜1, y˜2]
19: l = argmin
j∈1,2
(number of erasures in y˜j)
20: h′′1 , u
n
n/2+1, j
′ ← DecBE(k2, y˜l,A
c
2, s−1, r, j
′
1 + 1)
21: h′′ = [h′′1 , h
′′
1 ]
22: hn1 = h
′ ⊕ h′′
23: end if
24: return un1 , h
n
1 , j
′
ui′ = yi1 ⊕i∈Ac ui, and the corresponding codeword is also
retrieved correctly. Hence, the decoder is successful. Note that
this case corresponds to lines 4-12 of Algorithm 2.
Case 2: r > 0. The code length is n = 2s+1 and the
key length is
∑s+1
i=r+1
(
s+1
i
)
. We split the key indices into
two parts, namely Ac1 and A
c
2, representing the key bits k1
and k2 in the first and the second half sub-blocks of u, re-
spectively. The lengths of k1 and k2 are |A
c
1| =
∑s
i=r
(
s
i
)
and |Ac2| =
∑s
i=r+1
(
s
i
)
, respectively, due to the afore-
mentioned choice of indices. The decoder first computes
y¯ = y
n/2
1 ⊕ y
n
n/2+1 which will have at most 2
s+1−r − 1
erasures. It then passes this to the left child, in the bi-
nary tree representation terminology discussed earlier,
along with k1 and the set of its corresponding indices A
c
1.
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The left child decodes a codeword of length n′ = 2s us-
ing a code with parameter r′ = r − 1 > 0, which can
correct up to 2s−r
′
− 1 = 2s+1−r − 1 erasures, and re-
trieves the message bits in u
n/2
1 given the key k1 of length∑s
i=r′+1
(
s
i
)
=
∑s
i=r
(
s
i
)
. The decoder on the left child
is successful by induction hypothesis. It outputs u
n/2
1 and
h′1. After that, the decoder computes h
′
2 = u
n/2
1 G˜(s, r) fol-
lowed by h′ = [h′1 ⊕ h
′
2, h
′
2]. Then, the decoder computes
y˜n1 = y
n
1 ⊕ h
′ and chooses either y˜
n/2
1 or y˜
n
n/2+1, whichever
has a smaller number of erasures, and passes it to the right
child together with k2 and the corresponding set of indices
Ac2. The number of erasures in what is passed to this child is
at most 2s+1−r/2 − 1 = 2s−r − 1, and the length of the key
is
∑s
i=r+1
(
s
i
)
. The decoder on this child decodes a codeword
of length n′ = 2s using a code with parameter r′ = r > 0,
which can correct up to 2s−r
′
−1 = 2s−r−1 erasures and re-
trieves the message bits in unn/2+1 using the key k2 of length∑s
i=r′+1
(
s
i
)
=
∑s
i=r+1
(
s
i
)
. Decoding here is also success-
ful by induction hypothesis. It outputs unn/2+1 and h
′′
1 . The
overall decoder then computes h′′ = [h′′1 , h
′′
1 ] and outputs
hn1 = h
′ ⊕ h′′ and un1 . Hence, u
n
1 is retrieved and the proof is
complete.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we propose a model for threshold-secure
coding with a shared key such that specific conditions for reli-
ability and security based on information-theoretic measures
are met. The specification of such model includes a threshold
parameter which is to be designed based on the applica-
tion for such coding schemes. Also, methods for utilizing
error-correcting linear codes in constructing threshold-secure
coding schemes are discussed, where the parameter t of the
threshold-secure scheme is shown to be directly related to
the minimum distance of the underlying linear code. Fur-
thermore, a coding scheme based on Reed-Muller codes is
described. Its encoding is done recursively and is shown to
satisfy the conditions for a proper code. Moreover, a setup
taking into account the noise in the communication channel
between legitimate parties is considered. Then, a robust and
threshold-secure coding scheme, based on code concatena-
tion, is suggested for general channels. Also, a unified coding
schemes built upon Reed-Muller codes for both thresh-
old security and robustness in the presence of erasures is
described.
A possible direction for future work is to design coding
schemes based on punctured Reed-Muller codes to allow
for more flexible rates. To this end, ideas from punctured
schemes for closely related polar codes can be useful [35],
[36]. Another possible direction of future work is to study
threshold security in settings with wiretap channels, where
eavesdropper’s channel is also noisy. Also, extending the con-
sidered setup to multi-user scenarios, as in wiretap multiple
access [37] or as in multi-user secret sharing setups [38], is
another interesting future direction.
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